The Silentbook Shelf in the Herculanean Library

by Simon Laursen

The library, buried in various parts of a luxurious villa (the '*Villa dei papiri*') outside Herculaneum during the AD 79 eruption of Vesuvius and unearthed in the 1750'ies, is surely one of the wonders of the classical world. It is so by its existence alone, but even more by its content: the works of mainly one Epicurean philosopher of the 1st century BC, an otherwise somewhat shadowy figure by the name of Philodemus, and in addition to that some works by other Epicurean philosophers, mostly minor, and finally some books from Epicurus' probably most important work, "On nature". Philodemus was interested above all in aesthetics; he wrote extensively on rhetoric, poetry and music, as it appears from his works found in the library; but he also found ethics important, writing several works on (practical) ethics, adding works on theology as well as on epistemology. The one dimension of his philosophical *oeuvre* that has left any trace in ancient literature elsewhere (*DL* 10,3) was a history of philosophy, and this occupation is also clearly observable in the library, with several works on the Epicurean school, above all in its very early phase, and some on other schools. In short, a quite unique treasury of information on a period and on topics in ancient philosophy that is otherwise far too little known.

After a tumultuous early history and a long period of neglect interrupted only by sporadic one-man campaigns the library has at last been the subject of sufficient treatment, since Marcello Gigante some 30-odd years ago inaugurated the coordinated international efforts of the *Centro Internazionale di Studi sui Papiri Ercolanesi*. In the past decade or so the anglo-american 'Philodemus group' has taken upon itself, in the wake of much research done by Gigante's *équipe* in Naples, to re-edit Philodemus'works on aesthetics.[1] All in all, the number of modern editions made with the proper equipment and provided with commentaries and indexes is now so large that editors can search for parallel material in the Herculanean library without feeling that they are groping in the dark, and questions may be asked about the internal structure of the library with greater hopes for an answer than ever before.

Given Philodemus'interest in the history of philosophy and his method of summarizing rival theories before offering his own thoughts we should be able in the library to find a lot of texts, those that served him when he collected the information he needed. We should, in short, be able to identify his sources in the library itself. But this is where the problem arises that this paper tries to open. For even though Philodemus does constantly refer to books and letters by Epicurus as well as by other early leading members of the school, the 'great masters' or *kathegemones*, not to mention all other kinds of philosophers, we do not have those books and letters. The books by Epicurus that we *do* find in the Herculanean library Philodemus does not seem to use.

Part I The sources for "On nature"

The problem seems to concern all parts of the library in some way or another, but it has come to my attention in my work on the 25th book of Epicurus' 'On nature', and I shall deal with it from the 'On nature' angle. This is the more reasonable as all the books by Epicurus actually preserved in the library are from that work.

I shall not try to reconstruct the 'On nature' – I think that there is not enough material for any such attempt.[2] – but I shall have to survey

the sources for our knowledge of the work. Basically, there are two, and only two, sources: the *scholia* to the two letters by Epicurus in Diogenes Laertius (the letter to Herodotus and the letter to Pythocles), and the Herculanean papyri. The Herculanean papyri give us information at three levels: preserved books, books quoted or mentioned by Philodemus (or other authors) in such a way as to make it reasonable to assume that they had themselves had access to the books mentioned, and books mentioned that they may never have read. The very few references by non-members of the school[3] could imply that the work did not circulate outside the school itself.

Both the letter to Herodotus and the letter to Pythocles make it perfectly clear that they are *epitomai*, summaries designed to help memorizing larger works, and particularly the letter to Herodotus does probably refer to the 'On nature'. The letter to Herodotus presents itself (*DL* 10, 35-37) as a summary for advanced readers, and mentions yet another work written for less advanced students, which, I have no doubt, must be the socalled 'Large epitome'. In both letters we find explanatory insertions with references to the 'On nature' as well as to the 'Large epitome'. These insertions probably derive from ancient commentaries, passing through a stage in which they were added in the margin of some edition of the letters ('*scholia*'). The existence at a very early stage of some sort of edition of Epicurus' letters is secured by a famous fragment of the 'Life of Philonides',[4] and the same text informs us about the existence of commentaries on the 'On nature'already in the 2nd century BC (see below); in book 14 which is preserved we find a variety of marginal additions, one of them certainly an explanation of the text, and a quite learned one at that (Leone 1984: 27). The information contained in the *scholia* inserted into the two letters may well be, and in my view probably is, based on some commentary to the letters, and the process of inserting the scholia must have taken place in antiquity, probably before Diogenes inserted the letters in his own work.

The *scholia* refer to books 1 (Hdt. 39 and 40), 2 (Hdt. 73), 11 (Pyth. 91), 12 (Hdt. 74; Pyth. 96), 14 and 15 (Hdt. 40); the large summary is mentioned three times (Hdt. 39, 40 and 73), in conjunction with the references to books 1 and 2. Books 14 and 15 seem to be seen as a unity, and are only mentioned once, together with book 1 and the large summary. One of the references in the letter to Pythocles even quotes Epicurus *verbatim*.[5] All *scholia* are concerned with strictly natural philosophy – the nature of bodies, of time, and of the cosmos, and, as we shall see, in general the information they provide fits well enough with what we know from other sources.

The *scholia* with explicit reference to books of the 'On nature' are found at some distance in the letters, and they come in bundles. There are other *scholia* throughout the letters. Some bring references internally in the text, some simple explanations of words, some (perhaps) textual alternatives, and some refer to other texts by the general phrase 'in other works' (Hdt. 66, 74; RS 1). Even if one counts all the minor *scholia* in, there are large gaps left uncommented, and whoever incorporated the *scholia* cannot have been a very systematic man – surely Epicurus must have dealt with the senses and their truthfulness (Hdt. 46-53) and with the manifold problems of the atom, such as the atomic minimum, (Hdt. 54 – 62) in 'On nature', but there are no *scholia* in those passages of the letter.[6] It may therefore be a coincidence that we find only the six books listed above mentioned in the letters.

PHerc. 1044, a description of the life of the Epicurean philosopher Philonides, who was active at the Seleucid court during the reign of Demetrius V Soter (162-150 BC), contains some references to the 'On nature', mostly about exegetical work on it. The references are very hard to understand, but it seems fairly certain that at that time there existed a commentary on books 1 to 23 or 33, probably by one Artemon,[7] and, perhaps more interestingly, that Philonides himself produced commentaries on books 6 and 8 (fr. 7 and 13 inf.). Given that Philonides was probably a geometrician by training and the context of the reference to book 8 in fr. 13 f., it seems a reasonable assumption that Philonides was interested in book 8 for geometrical reasons, and in fact, probably because he wanted to work on the

Epicurean theory of the minimum. There is no suggestion that Philodemus ever had these books in his possession; in fact, it is probably more precise to say that in PHerc. 1044 we get a glimpse at the range of 'On nature' books available in Syria in the 2nd century BC. Philonides evidently had to work hard to put a library together (PHerc. 1044 fr. 66), so books by Epicurus cannot have been too easy to come by even in the 2nd century BC. I once (Laursen 1993) suggested that Philonides was Philodemus"role model' as house philosopher to Piso in the villa, and PHerc. 1044 his handbook in that respect, and if this is right, Philodemus will have desired to collect books in the same way that Philonides did. There is no reason to believe that it was all that easier in the south of Italy in the 1st century BC than it had been in Syria in the 2nd.

'On nature' is mentioned at least twice in PHerc. 998, and the evidence given is extremely interesting. Book 32 contained a brief summary of Epicurus'definition of the soul ([32] Arr.^{2}); and book 34 discussed a 'κριτή[ριον τ]ῶν δήλων' (Tepedino Guerra 1987); but as neither subject or author of the work is known, this evidence cannot be used to show that Philodemus knew these books. The same goes for the extremely uncertain reference to book 16 in PHerc. 558 fr. 11,2, although odds are that this papyrus contains a work by Philodemus on the history of philosophy.[8]

Fr. 44 of PHerc. 1111, a work equally anonymous and with no firmly established content, contains a reference to books 12 and 13 in close proximity to Epicurus' 'On sanctity'.[9]

In the 'On piety' Philodemus finds occasion to refer to books 12, 13, 22 (or 32) and 35 of the 'On nature', and possibly to books 1, 6 and 8 as well. Of these, the references to books 13 (fr. 87 Us.; [27.2] Arr. 2) and 35 (fr. 91 Us.; [33] Arr.2), found in the same passage (col. 37 Obbink), demand very little comment: these books contained material relevant for the relation of god and man. The reference to book 22 (or perhaps 32)[10] is no more problematic: this book made it possible to discuss the nature of the gods in analogy to the nature of time. The reference to book 1 consists in a verbal quotation without any source marked; the source could, however, just as well, or even better, be the letter to Herodotus 40, and, anyway, the speaker at this point of 'On piety' is certainly not Philodemus.[11]

More problematic the rest of the references. From PHerc. 1044 we have already assumed that books 6 and 8, and quite certainly book 8, may well have treated of fundamental problems of the nature of the atom. The reference in 'On piety'(col. 38 Obbink) is very difficult to understand in itself, but however the words are to be understood, they will fit very poorly with fundamental atomic theory. Obbink remains open to the possibility that the reference is to another work (probably by Metrodorus), and given the discrepancy of the evidence I find this the wiser course to take.[12]

We face a similar, but less extreme, problem with the references to book 12. The references in the *scholia* to the letters are decidedly physical, and the references in the 'On piety' are decidedly theological. One (fr. 84 Us.; [27.1] Arr.^{2}; col. 8 Obbink) speaks of the origin of religion, the other (fr. 87 Us., [27.2] Arr.^{2}; col. 19 Obbink) is the famous criticism of Prodicus, Diagoras and Critias for their atheism. Given the divine aspects of τὰ μετέωρα in Greek religion and philosophy, the link is not inconceivable, and the combined sources give us a fairly good idea of the book.

When one compares the two first groups of evidence about the 'On nature', the most striking thing is that they hardly coincide at all. The books that interested the commentator(s) to the letters simply did not appeal to Philodemus, with the exception of book 12 – but this proves to be the exception that confirms the rule, for what attracts Philodemus there is quite another thing than what attracted the commentator(s). Philodemus goes to find material on theology, a burning issue in his day and age, and neglects the theoretical questions of natural philosophy. The entire output of Philodemus points in that direction with its almost absolute exclusion of physics, and much the same can be said of Cicero's philosophical works, focused as it is on ethics, theology and epistemology. This, then, should be reflected in the books of 'On nature' in the library. But it is not.

We have readable, even if sometimes not very

readable, papyri of books 2, 11, 14, 15, 25, 28 plus the remains of five books whose numbers are unknown. In addition to that there is a host of poorly preserved papyri which may, on palaeographical grounds or because of single words, be part of the work.[13] The fact remains that the list is much more in accordance with the that of the *scholia* than with Philodemus'. The content of the books, as far as the material allows us to see, seems to fit well enough: book 11 *is* about celestial phenomena, books 14 and 15 deal with fundamental questions of matter, though in a critical stance, and can easily be taken as a supplement to book 1, as the *scholia* seem to imply. Book 25 treats of problems in psychology (I shall return to this book more fully in the second part); book 28 discusses epistemological problems. Of the five remaining papyri, lacking a number, three are almost illegible (PHerc. 362, 989 and 1385); and the fourth (PHerc. 1431, [36] Arr.2) uses words such as 'fearful', 'suspicion', 'fearless', 'myth', 'prevailing opinion', 'beating of the pulse', 'symmetry of the pores'. and finally 'belief about the invisible things towards the natural goal' – and therefore is hardly book 1, 12 or 13. The fifth (PHerc. 1413, [37] Arr.[2]) presents a more delicate problem, since its subject is time. We would conclude from the *scholia* that it is book 2, were it not for the fact that book 2 is preserved and, in the part still extant, deals with 'images' (εἴδωλα). The summary in the end of the book confirms that the book dealt with these, but as Sedley has shown, it may well have treated other subjects earlier in the volume.[14] This, however, does not alter the position for the fifth nameless book: it remains nameless.

The literary form of 'On nature' is a problem in its own right. The fifth nameless book ([37]) is a dialogue, it seems; and book 28 is a 'pseudo-dialogue' with Metrodorus, correcting errors made both by him andperhaps) by Epicurus himself. Book 25 is addressed to a group of adherents who have somehow made a serious mistake.[15] The other books preserved have a more standard form. The natural assumption from these facts would be that the work was composed of books originally written separately, but this is strongly contradicted by a repeated insistence at the ends of the books that they form part of a series. Book 2 promises a treatment of 'what fits' in the books following; book 11 declares that the next book will contain further clarification of celestial questions; and book 28 even terms itself book 28 at the end. And the numberless book, PHerc. 1431, even refers back to book 1 ([36.24.1-6] Arr.[2]). Epicurus clearly expected that the 'On nature' would be available as a whole.

Yet it was not, when Vesuvius erupted in 79 AD. The distribution of papyri of 'On nature' still found in the library at least makes it highly unlikely that it was. Two of the books, 2 and 11, are preserved in each two papyri in the library; a third one, 25, is there in three copies. Some of the books have palaeographic similarities that might suggest that they once formed part of complete copies of the entire work which ran to 37 volumes (*DL* 10, 27); prudence has kept those tempted by the idea from insisting.[16] If such similarities were to be taken to indicate complete copies in the library, we would have to consider the presence of at least 74 papyri containing Epicurus' 'On nature',[17] and we should have to ask ourselves what happened to all those books, and what the circumstances may be that have determined our recovery from the vulcanic mud of precisely this number of papyri, with its preponderance of books unknown to Philodemus but so very central to the commentators of the letters to Herodotus and Pythocles.

It cannot be an accident that the papyri actually found show this coincidence with the list of the *scholia*. One possible explanation is that the books preserved were favourite books – the books that the Epicureans were supposed to keep especially in mind. This is the explanation offered by David Sedley. But if this is the case it is difficult to understand why not a single one of the books that Philodemus demonstrably *did* like to read has survived. Books 1, 2 and 11 – 15 dealt with matters far from Philodemus' interests, with the exception of book 12 and possibly 13. Why do we possess two copies of books 2 and 11, and three of book 25 – and none of 12 or 13, who were also 'favourite'? Dirk Obbink observes that by far the most references in the Herculanean library to 'On nature' are found in

Philodemus' 'On piety', that is 7 out of 10. As David Sedley points out, there are 3 more in the life of Philonides, and the references to 'On nature' are far more frequent than those to other works by Epicurus, such as the 'On rhetoric', the 'On lives' and the 'Symposium'. Obbink notes that Philodemus cites Epicurus' letters very often, and it may be added that many of these references are verbal quotations.[18]

This is where the real problem lies. For none of these works are found in the library either. An alternative explanation for the state of things is that all the books worth owning, whether by Epicurus or by anyone else,[19] that once formed part of the library, were removed in antiquity. When Vesuvius erupted, Philodemus had been dead for a century; his library was left in the villa. We may compare what happens to your grandparents library: what is left in the boxes in the attic when the heirs have sold off all the books that the second hand bookstore will but? Those, of course, that the bookstore cannot sell – the outdated, unintelligible, even boaring ones. One day you will throw them away. But so far they are still there. Basically, I suspect, that is what happened in the *Villa dei papiri*.

This sets the library in a different light. The many books by Philodemus will be there because noone found them very interesting; probably there were better sources of information on the topics available, and nobody thought Philodemus' reactions to theories in aesthetics or epistemology very interesting. His ethical works fared no better. As is well known, his theological works are the ones that have made the greatest impact, being used by Cicero himself; his works on the history of philosophy were not forgotten either.[20] Most of the books of 'On nature' left in the library were of great interest to 'professional' Epicureans, as we can see in the *scholia*, but evidently there was no shortage of those books – at least they were not taken away. Paradoxically, this testifies to their importance – they were very common. Books 12, 22 (?), 32, 34 and 35 will have been rarer, more desired at any rate. Obviously, books of the 'On nature' could be read as separate entities; the series character was no more dominant than to allow that. If so, we need not really assume that there ever was a complete copy of 'On nature' in Herculaneum, let alone two. Perhaps this explains why books 25 and 28 are there, isolated.

Part II References in practice

But it does not explain why book 25 is there in three copies. Why would Philodemus have wanted three copies of a book that he never quotes by number? Perhaps he *does* use the book, but presupposes such a degree of familiarity with it that he does not feel the need to refer to it explicitly. There are reasons to believe that 'On nature' could be taken for granted in this way; Philodemus usually quotes the work by number alone,[21] and perhaps there are other quotations like the possible quotation in 'On piety' of book 1 without indication of source, even if less verbal than that. We should therefore search for less direct references to the 25th book.

This is a much more difficult enterprise than the one I have pursued so far; not only is it much more time-consuming, but also more liable to error, and it cannot be complete, as the investigation in the first part of this paper can reasonably claim to be. But it is also much more important. All other ancient texts have, as Arrighetti once pointed out, had the benefit of generations of scholars working hard to find material with which to compare and thus understand more. I have worked on the 25th book of 'On nature' longer than I care to remember, and it seems to me to contain, imply and presuppose highly interesting and very important elements of Epicurus' philosophy. The lack of reference is disquieting. Can it really be that neither Philodemus – who must have been the owner of all three copies – nor anyone else in antiquity saw what I think I see: that this book promises new perspectives, new problems, and perhaps helps to solve others, in short, that it is a very good book?

There is a number of points of contact between the 25th book and the rest of Epicurean literature (not only Philodemus), and I am sure that more will be found as new editions are published. In this paper, I shall confine myself to presenting only three examples, each of its own type. The first type is a reference by 'ti-

tle', that is, not by book number but by a description of the content of the book. The second works by linguistic similarity – we find the terminology of book 25 reproduced in a more or less unambiguous way. The third type works by doctrinal similarity: what is said in book 25 is also said elsewhere but in another way, with other words.

The first kind continues the line of argument that I followed in the first part. The point of view is external. The beginning of the 25th book is largely lost; this is a common condition for Herculanean texts. We may have small pieces of text from the beginning; if the fragments identified as such *are* such (as I am sure they are), in the early parts of the book Epicurus was discussing the concept of causality and problems related to the unity of the mind (Laursen 1995: 66 – 74). Later on, we find Epicurus discussing our intake of sensory information; in the beginning the fragments are widely separated, and it is hard to get a firm grip of the progression of the argument (Laursen 1995: 74 – 103). An extremely interesting passage on self-awareness follows (Laursen 1995: 103-108 ≈ [34.12.6-18] Arr.2); then comes a difficult stretch of text with almost inaccessible terminology which is at issue in the next example (Laursen 1997: 14-33 ≈ [34.19-26] Arr.^{2}). Towards the end of the book, Epicurus makes a digression to refute determinism (Laursen 1997: 33-42 ≈ *LS* 20 C ≈ [34.26-30] Arr.^{2}), and then comes a summary, very long and difficult to follow but still clear enough to show that the theme of the text was the formation of the mind and the concepts *etc.* that we store in it (Laursen 1997: 42-50; Laursen 1992; ≈ [34.31-33] Arr.^{2}).

The long digression on determinism ends with a passage praising the first 'aetiologists', who were largely right, but hadn't seen all the truth. They had come to contradict themselves, but they did non notice. Still, Epicurus acknowledges their greatness. The identification of the target as primarily Democritus is no doubt as correct as it is old. It is one of the few constants in the interpretation of this text, which is the most discussed single passage of the 25th book, and possibly of the entire Herculanean library.[22]

There is a reference to something written 'Against Democritus' in Philodemus' book 'On liberty of speech', *fr.* 20 Olivieri. The title of the book itself stresses the fact that the book was a kind of epitome from the teachings of Zeno, leader of the school of Epicurus in the first half of the first century BC. The passage in 'On liberty' says that ἐν τοῖς πρὸς Δημόκριτον ... διὰ τέλους Epicurus insists on showing tolerance towards errors. διά τέλους must mean 'in the end' (LSJ sv. διά, A I 2 fin.); the complement of τὰ πρὸς Δημόκριτον is not, I suspect, books (βιβλία), but probably (ἀνα)γεγραμμένα;[23] there need not be more than one book involved, and not even necessarily as much as a whole book. No description would fit the passage in the 25th book better, whether we assume that the whole book was thought to be 'Against Democritus' or only the passage criticizing the determinists. If so, Philodemus, or at least his source Zenon, had read the 25th book, and the book is no longer completely unknown.

This, of course, is no real help in understanding Epicurus' difficult text. But I take the opportunity to point out that many of the books that Philodemus does not mention or the library does not seem to contain may have had other names besides the ones we know. Reference by number is precise but not very intuitive; perhaps even some of the books of 'On nature' had alternative titles. A book such as 'On atoms and void' (*DL* 10,27) could well be 'On nature' I, and a book such as 'On the corner in the atom' (*DL* 10,28) would probably have aroused the interest of the mathematician Philonides, and it may well have been identical to book 6 or 8 of 'On nature'. All this does, of course, not remedy the central problem of this paper: there are no other books by Epicurus in the library than the ones mentioned above, however they are referred to.

This is, as I said, an external approach to the problem. Of course, Philodemus (or Zenon) may be referring to another text of which we know nothing. But there is more economy in assuming that he refers to the 25th book. But it is time to turn to the much more difficult internal approach. It is more difficult for two reasons. Firstly, Epicurus expresses himself in ususually imperspicuous language in book 25,

the text is almost in code. Secondly, the parallels I am searching for may not be written in that code.

The code is concentrated in the end of the central expository section of the preserved text (Laursen 1997: 14-33; [34.20-27] Arr.^{2}). It also plays an important role in some earlier passages, but it is only in this passage that Epicurus runs terminologically berserk. The word he uses are 'the things begotten', τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα; 'the original constitution', ἡ ἐχ ἀρῆς σύστασς; 'the first constitution', ἡ πρώτη σύστασις, a couple of times with the all-important addition 'of the atoms and the thing begotten' (τῶν τε ἀτόμων ἅμα καὶ τοῦ ἀπογεννηθέντος); and finally, 'the growing constitution', (ἡ) ἐπαυξομένη (σύστασις). Other words seem at first to be less technical, namely 'the atoms', 'the seeds' (τὰ σπέρματα), 'the first natures' (αἱ πρῶται φύσεις) and a few more – but the simplicity is, perhaps, an illusion. This is not the place for a thorough-going analysis of the material, and I shall simply be dogmatic – offering my own interpretation of the terms as if it were a secure fact – which it is not.[24]

Every living being has some kind of mind. Human thinking differs from the mental activity of animals only in complexity, not in kind. Minds are material, they are made up of atoms, and their way of functioning is really just the way their constitutive atoms interact. These atoms have a fundamental way of interacting that cannot ever cease completely, even though you work hard to change it. This fundamental way of interacting is, I think, what Epicurus calls our 'original constitution', or our 'nature'.

But there is nothing in this world that is not affected by something else. The mental atoms interact between themselves, but they also interact with the world around the mind. This process results in the creation of 'things begotten'. These may come about by external influx as well as by internal procedures; that is, fundamentally the mind works in the same way whether we perceive the outer world or we think – Epicurus expressly mentions memory and reasoning as 'internal' functions able to create 'things begotten'.

There is evidence in the text that the 'things begotten' are made up of atoms: certain atoms will, if 'thrown against each other', 'beget' certain things and set certain actions going. The atoms are necessarily the ones in the mind; these therefore perform more than one set of movements. They are still somehow the expression of the 'original constitution', but they are also the expression of the 'thing begotten'. This cannot go on; somehow the two 'expressions' must come to terms, and this coming to terms is, I think, precisely 'the first constitution of (the previous state of) the atoms and the thing begotten'. This is in itself a potentially active entity; but whether and how it acts depends on whether the 'original constitution' was the stronger part in the process and could prevent any change, or the 'thing begotten' was stronger and created a real, full-scale new element in the living being. Sometimes, it seems, the mind has 'stiffened up' and almost nothing will affect you; and even if you have not 'stiffened up', there is a limit to how much you can develop. By nature, or 'the original constitution', we all have individual potentialities ('seeds') for change but only so much change.[25] This is most clearly put in the very last words of the section ([34.26] Arr.^{2}). This passage also helps understand what Epicurus is talking about when he talks about these developments. These are the events from which actions, thoughts and dispositions spring. The fundamental procedures for all these three things – and possibly all other mental states and processes – are the same.

The 'first constitution' is, however, only the first step in a long procedure. When we act, the 'constitution' is 'growing'; and there is no reason to doubt that all the 'constitutions' generated by the compromise of 'atoms' and 'things begotten' somehow 'grow' when they are active.

The theory has ramifications, some of them only hinted at, the most important being the question of the freedom of the will – which is described, I think, as freedom in processing external intake. Epicurus gives the impression of pressing his language to the edge of its possibilities. What he is trying to do, I think, is to develop a terminology capable of describing all mental activity with only one set of words. He wants to describe both actions, thoughts and dispositions, as well as feelings of both joy and fear, as basically one thing – different states of

the constitution. If the result sounds weird, this should not make us blind to the significance of the attempt. The 'thing begotten' of the 25th book may be compared to, e. g., the Stoic φαντασία καταληπτική, which has an intrinsic capacity of influencing the mind, just as the 'thing begotten' sometimes by itself forces an alteration in the constitution, a word that had a future in Stoic theory as well.[26]

But did the new set of words have a future in Epicureanism? Could a theory claiming the fundamental identity in kind of all mental states serve Philodemus' purposes or could it not? May we expect to find the philosophy of the 25th book used in Philodemus' writings or was it too technical? In fact, I have found surprisingly few traces of it. Philodemus was a man of many interests, but to take only two of them, it seems to me that the question of whether our mind is 'prepared' to receive some kinds of information and not other kinds is central in aesthetics; and in such a work as 'On liberty of speech' Philodemus is interested in how people work inside – what should you say to a person to make him react in the right way and become an Epicurean? In fact, this last question is a problem in rhetorical theory as well, and the first of my two examples comes precisely from Philodemus' rhetorics.

I have searched long for examples of 'the first constitution' in Philodemus, but I have found only one instance. Perhaps the expression proved too esoteric to find much space in literature; if this is the explanation there is also some logic in the fact that the single example has propped up in the book of the rhetoric where Philodemus argues against the claim of Nausiphanes, Epicurus'reviled teacher, that it is possible for the natural philosopher on the basis of his superior knowledge of nature to become a better rhetorician and, what is more, a better politician. This, of course, Philodemus denies. Here and there the book comes close to technical language, but then we suddenly find the very words: 'and he does not become such out of some moral weakness, nor in accordance with the constitution, that is, the first, nor by choice'.[27] This seems to fit well: some state created out of impulses or the like and then fixed in the mind is just the middle between 'moral weakness', which is then an expression of a bad 'original constitution', and individual choices made in some single situation. But when one reads on, one gets a little less certain about this interpretation. Philodemus talks about the philosopher as against a less intelligent man; the philosopher can reason and remember similar and not similar things and can stick to what is conducive to happiness, whereas the other person has 'a system by no means able to reason and bring about the things leading to happiness'.[28] 'System' here enters the group of words under consideration without problems, but here we must be facing a parallel expression for 'original constitution'. That must also be the case a little later, when the philosopher is described as able to look through the errors of ordinary men's business and still stick to happiness, 'for noone is more [naturally] endowed as regards their constitution than those that (use) reasoning and memories of [similar and dissimilar] sensations'.[29] The problems that lurk here are such as to make the one instance of a 'first' constitution outside Epicurus that I have been able to find less conclusive than I should have preferred it to be.

It is even less conclusive, perhaps. Hans von Arnim has argued (von Arnim 1898: 45) that Philodemus in this part of the rhetoric draws heavily on a work by Metrodorus, 'Against those who claim that physiologists are good rhetors'. If this is so, the problem about using the expression 'the first constitution'may move on to lie with Metrodorus, and we are still left with the question whether Philodemus ever read the 25th book. It seems appropriate to mention that Metrodorus' work is not in the library – nor is any other work by Metrodorus.

The example from the rhetorical works is one of terminology; and since this terminology is not found elsewhere in Epicurus it is a fair assumption that there is some connection between the texts. If some text expresses the fundamental ideas of the book 25 theory but uses a different set of words, the question whether the direct and even the ultimate source is book 25 is more difficult to answer. In the fourth book of 'On music' Philodemus tells us that people, if they are 'similar in their sensory apparatus as to the disposition' – a very

clumsy expression in Greek as well – make the same judgments about the qualities of a piece of music. 'At least in such cases,' Philodemus continues, 'it is possible that differing secondary sensations occur in relation to some predispositions', whereas the ears themselves will not allow such differences. It is therefore 'according to their beliefs' that people differ in their evaluation of the melodies discussed. The 'more physical' point out that no ethical quality belongs to music in itself. No kind of music will ever by itself have an ethical effect, nor can it 'turn anybody away from one impulse to another, or bring the disposition one has to increase or diminish'.[30] In the 25th book Epicurus has three levels of expression: the first is the one described above, highly technical at the 'atomic' level, the second speaks of 'things coming in from the outside' etc., a sort of 'macrophysical' level, the third is more standard in describing the mental, using words such as 'disposition', 'belief' and 'thought'. It would seem that a 'disposition' was the same as a 'constitution', and more likely a 'first' one than any other kind. 'Disposition' was standard philosophical parlance, while 'first constitution' was not. We have seen that the 'constitutions' 'grow', when they are activated; could it be that they may also diminish, without Epicurus telling us? And if disposition and '(first) constitution' are the same, may we then compare the idea that 'it is possible that differing secondary sensations occur in relation to some predispositions' with the passage in Epicurus where we are told that it is eventually up to us and our 'beliefs' what the things that we take in through the senses and that become 'things begotten' turn out to be? Are the 'predispositions' in Philodemus identical with Epicurus' beliefs, and are the 'secondary sensations' – ἐπαισθήσεις is the technical word – the process by which the mind takes notice of the 'things begotten' and absorbs them into a 'first constitution'? Again, the problems accumulate, problems that may perhaps be solved by taking the philosophical side of Philodemus' text more seriously. But even if the problems of determining the precise content of the theory Philodemus implies here are some day set straight and my hunch of a connection proves right the language Philodemus speaks here is not precisely the language of the technical part of 'On nature' book 25. As far as the initial question goes, there is no proof that Philodemus ever read the 25th book.

Perhaps the attempt to find, and perhaps even the hope to find, material in the library pointing to the 25th book is by itself in vain. If Philodemus' work is mainly meant to be read by people like Piso, his patron, he will not have used such abstruse ways of expressing himself as Epicurus evidently allowed himself to do from time to time. There is probably more to find than I have found, but it will probably be at the third level of expression – using the philosophical *lingua franca* of the day. It may well be why we still find the 25th book in the library – it was simply too difficult to understand. I suspect that all the useful, understandable, interesting books by Epicurus that Philodemus mentions and quotes were removed. I'm not sure that there ever was a complete copy of the 'On nature' in the library. The books still there fit too well with what the scholia to the letters seem to presuppose. Perhaps they too were too difficult, or too scholastic to the tastes of the reading public of the early empire. I should have liked to have a copy of Artemon's commentary to the 25th book to guide me through it, but there is no way of telling whether Philodemus had a copy of it. Still, it seems evident that such 'secondary' literature played an important role in the school, and I think it fair to say that it is odd that no such work appears in the library. Perhaps books like that were removed because they were useful – and intelligible. The absence of the Epicurus' letters, of his 'Rhetoric' or his 'Symposium', as well as of a number of other works quoted *verbatim* by Philodemus on a number of occasions, remains the most important problem. Perhaps not all the books I've been looking for were ever there – but it seems clear that too many are missing for us to hope to find them in another library in the villa or assume that they are merely in a state not allowing unrolling. The library has, I'm sure, been plundered.

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NOTES

1. I had the honour of giving this paper in an earlier version at the 1995 meeting of the Philodemus group in Austin, Texas; and I was allowed to take part in the work of the group on that occasion. The dedication to and quality of the work done there, not to mention the tolerant attentiveness exhibited by all partaking in the event, has remained and will for ever remain a sublime expression of what research may be. The Philodemus group also has a home page: *www.humnet.ucla.edu/humnet/classics/Philodemus/philhome.htm* unfortunately not kept very well up to date. – I originally planned to publish this paper largely as it was given in Austin, but the following years have seen the publication of two books which make this impossible: Sedley 1998, containing the last version of Sedley's attempts to reconstruct Epicurus' "On nature", and Obbink 1996, with a wealth of information on the "On nature". There is an overview of the "On nature" in Erler 1994, and Daniel Delattre has published a useful survey of the titles cited by Philodemus in Delattre 1996. – Finally it is necessary to insist that all this would never have been possible without the stubborn, insistent dexterity of Marcello Gigante both in guiding the work in Naples and in raising funds for it.
2. The problem has been faced by Gr. Arrighetti (see appendices to Arrighetti 1973) and D. Sedley (latest contribution Sedley 1998). Essential for both is the idea that the distribution of topis in Epicurus' letters to Herodotus and Pythocles somehow mirrors the development in "On nature". Sedley thinks that the letter to Herodotus was written to summarize only books 1-13. For an overview of the debate, see Erler 1994: 94-95. – On my doubts, see further n. 13 and 15.
3. If in fact any exist; what Usener quotes as such in the *Epicurea*, need not, in fact, indicate that anyone outside the school had ever set eyes on the work.
4. PHerc. 1044 fr. 14, 3 – 10 Gallo (in: Gallo 1980): Pepovh ≥k≥e≥n≥ δε νεωοις ἀργοις θξφελωμοθς και; "τ"ας εξπιτομας τ" θ'ν" εξπιστολθ'ν τθ'ν 'Επικοθωρ"οθ", Μητροδθωροθ, Πολθαιωνοθ, Ξρμαωρψοθ και; τθ'ν σ"θνηγ"μεω"νθ"ν κατα

γεωνος εξπ[α]ι[ο]στο[υ]λθ'ν[ο]. Some of this is slightly odd: what is the meaning of the perfect tense in pepovhken, and does the construction really mean that what the subject of the sentence (usually taken to be Philonides himself) did was to make 'even the epitomes useful for lazy young people'? Did these epitomes exist beforehand?

5. The *scholion* on Hdt. 74 could perhaps be construed, at least partly, as a *verbatim* quotation as well. I take the *scholion* to end with ειψειν.
6. Problems of the senses and their truth-value will have been discussed extensively in "On nature". As Diogenes Laertius (10, 30) makes clear, the Epicureans regarded epistemology as a branch of physics.
7. *Fr.* 7 Gallo; whether it is number 23 or 33 depends on whether one prefers to change ois[α].[ο]t of the papyrus to < tri > [α]kosto;n, as Gallo does, or to eijkostovn, as Sedley1998: 102 n. 22 would prefer. – Artemon is otherwise unknown, see Gallo 1980: 37.
8. I have not been able to really update my information on this papyrus. The book number is quoted by Obbink 1996: 305; Baldassarri 1976 despairs as to both type of work and actual contents of PHerc. 558, but on balance she believes it to be by Philodemus and connected with his works on the history of philosophy.
9. Fr. 41 Us. Å [19.5] Arr.[2]; new text in Obbink 1996: 300.
10. PHerc. 807 fr. 6; fr. 80 Us. [25] Arr.[2] Usener dryly remarks: 'vestigium incertum et inutile'.
11. PHerc. 437 fr. 3, col. 66 A, lines 1885-1897 Obbink (Å lib. inc. [39] Arr.[2]); Obbink *ad loc.* opts for 32 on the basis of one of Sedley's old reconstructions of "On nature" as a whole, but willingly admits that on papyrological grounds 22 is equally possible. Cfr. now Sedley 1998: 128.
12. PHerc. 1098 fr. 24, col. 2, lines 37-41 Obbink; Obbink,*ad loc.*, discusses the possibilities of derivation.
13. PHerc. 1077 fr. 4, col. 38, line. 1078-1089 Obbink with notes *ad loc.* When Sedley 1998: 117 insists that the reference in Philodemus must be to "On nature", he does so to suit his general thesis that there must be a treatment of psychology in these books of the "On nature". One could argue that a prolonged discussion of the atomic minimum would fit just as well in book 8, on Sedley's hypothesis, since that sort of problem is discussed in the letter to Herodotus just before psychology. Sedley would have to let books 5-8 discuss atomic theory, books 9 and 10 psychology. Such open possibilities are what makes me claim that a reconstruction, even hypothetical, of "On nature" is not possible. Cfr. n. 2.
14. PHerc. 296; PHerc. 363; PHerc. 454; PHerc. 459; PHerc. 908/1390; PHerc. 1037; PHerc. 1039; PHerc. 1158; PHerc. 1186; PHerc. 1199; PHerc. 1398; PHerc. 1489; PHerc. 1504; PHerc. 1639; PHerc. 1735. In Gigante 1979: 53, there is a list of papyri that probably or certainly contain "On nature"; the list above is a residual one containing all the papyri not otherwise taken into consideration in what follows; I have added a number of papyri that may, for palaeographical reasons, also be part of "On nature". The palaeographical arguments may be found dispersed in Cavallo 1983. Some of these ascriptions are more likely correct than others; a very good candidate is PHerc. 1039, see Puglia 1988.
15. Sedley 1998: 111-113; Sedley thinks that one of the subjects must have been 'time', since the *scholion* on Hdt. 73 says as much. It seems to Sedley, though, that the treatment of time can have been only preliminary, to show that 'time' was a kind of 'accident' and therefore not of a special ontological kind. The real treatment of time, Sedley thinks, must have come in book 10 (Sedley 1998: 119). It is a pressing question, then, why the *scholion* refers to the preliminary treatment of time in book 2 and not the more exhaustive one in book 10.
16. On [37], see Arrighetti 1973: 650; on book 25 see Laursen 1995: 92 and 1997: 39 (PHerc. 1056, 7, 3, 3) and 1997: 50 (PHerc. 697, 4, 2, 4, 2); also Sedley 1998: 104; on book 28 see Sedley 1973: 13.
17. The idea is something like a commonplace, aired on every possible occasion. More serious and more cautious: Cavallo 1983: 58-59; Capasso 1991: 152; Sedley 1998: 99.
18. If one counts all the PHerc. numbers given in the preceding notes, one arrives at a total of 35. The sum total of PHerc. numbers is 1835, out of which some 880 have been opened (see Capasso 1991: 82-83). This makes it reasonable to expect, in the 1837 numbers, 73 numbers with "On nature" fragments. But PHerc. 'numbers' are counted items, whether whole rolls, half rolls, scorzature or dislocated parts, not books. The total of actual books is probably only some 1100, and of these 1100 there will have been only 43 "On nature" *books*. Statistics in the library is, however, an insecure business.
19. Obbink 1996: 304-306; Sedley 1998: 99-100 (with remarks on Obbink's worries).
20. Delattre 1996 gives a useful list of all the books mentioned by Philodemus; the list is very long, and even so not quite complete. Hardly a single one of all the books (other than those by Philodemus himself) is still there in the library. Obviously, Philodemus may have borrowed many of these books and have restored them; perhaps he knew of many of them only from quotations (pace Delattre 1996: 168). But at least some of the books by Epicurus must have been in his possession.
21. Cicero, *De natura deorum*, I 28-41; Epicurus *fr.* 385a Us. (on p. 356); *DL* 10, 3; 24. Obviously, the books remain *our* primary source for most of what they discuss.
22. This is the most important result of Obbink's enquiries on the "On nature" quotations in the library, see Obbink 1996: 305. Interestingly, the manuscripts of the *scholion* on Hdt. 74 also omits reference to "On nature". Could this be an indication of authenticity?
23. Most important recent bibliography: Arrighetti 1979; Gigante 1981: 56-60; Sedley 1983; Laursen 1990, where the point I am making here is made on p. 4.
24. Sedley 1998: 102-103, discusses similar references in Epicurus.
25. All the instances of the terms and all their variations may be found by using the *index verborum* in Laursen 1997: 75 ss. I must ask the reader who wishes to go deeper into the matter to work his own way from there. The fullest discussion of the terminology as yet published is Annas 1993 (but see also her Annas 1992: 125 ss.); the latest is Everson 1999: 553-557. Further bibliography may be found there.
26. This idea is also expressed, but in relation to life and death, in *fr.* [185] Arr.[2] (-fr. 492 Us.), in language that also employs a suvstasi"-related word. For a text based on an autopsy of the papyrus, see Laursen 1988: 17 n. 27. Arrighetti's text is, however, essentially correct.
27. On the fantasiva katalhptikhv, see (e. g.) LS vol. 1 p. 250; the word suvstasi" is central in the Stoic theory of *oikeiosis* (see, *e. g.*, Inwood 1999: 677 ss.).
28. The text is PHerc. 1015/832, pars inf. 20, 3-7 (i. e. PHerc. 832, col. 20), published in Philodemi Volumina Rhetorica, ed. S. Sudhaus, vol. II, Lipsiae 1896 (repr. Amsterdam 1964), on p. 30. Since the text is not easy to come

by, I quote it in Greek: ο"θξ"δ, αξποω τινος κακιωας "γιω"ν"ε"ται τοιοθ'τος οθτε κατα σθωστασιν την πρθωτην οθτε κας, αιρεσιν.

29. Ibid., pars sup. XXXV 17-20 (i. e. PHerc. 1015 col. 35): σθστηωματος οθξξαμθς δθνατοθ' λογιωσασξαι και κατεργαωσασξαι τα προς εθξδαιμονιωαν; Sudhaus' edition p. 31.
30. Ibid., pars inf. 21, 10-15 (i. e. PHerc. 832 col. 21): εξπει; τ"α" (μυ σθππλεμεντ; Σθδηαθσ ηασ τ"θ'ν") κατα; τη;ν σθωστασιν οθξξεις "εθξφθεω"στερος τθ'ν σθ"λ"λ"ο"γ"ισ"μοις και; μνηωμαις "τθ'ν οΞμοιωθν και; αξνομοιωθ"ν αιξσξηω"σεθν"; Sudhaus' edition p. 32. The supplement of "τθ'ν οΞμοιωθν και; αξνομοιωθ"ν is quite certain, cfr. PHerc. 832 col. 20, 15-16.
31. PHerc. 1497, Ib 44-III 23, with omissions. Text in Neubecker 1986.